The Relationship of Personalized and Traditional IATs with Explicit Attitude and Behavioral Measures by Riffle, Rebecca Rae
Wright State University 
CORE Scholar 
Browse all Theses and Dissertations Theses and Dissertations 
2011 
The Relationship of Personalized and Traditional IATs with Explicit 
Attitude and Behavioral Measures 
Rebecca Rae Riffle 
Wright State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all 
 Part of the Industrial and Organizational Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Riffle, Rebecca Rae, "The Relationship of Personalized and Traditional IATs with Explicit Attitude and 
Behavioral Measures" (2011). Browse all Theses and Dissertations. 496. 
https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/etd_all/496 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at CORE Scholar. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Browse all Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of CORE 
Scholar. For more information, please contact library-corescholar@wright.edu. 
i 
 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP OF PERSONALIZED AND TRADITIONAL IATS WITH 
EXPLICIT ATTITUDE AND BEHAVIORAL MEASURES 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Master of Science 
 
By 
 
REBECCA RAE RIFFLE 
B.A., Cleveland State University, 2008 
B.S., Cleveland State University, 2008 
 
 
2011 
Wright State University 
  
ii 
 
WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY 
SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES 
September 16, 2011 
 
I HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS PREPARED 
UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY Rebecca Rae Riffle ENTITLED 
The Relationship of Personalized and Traditional IATs with Explicit 
Attitude and Behavioral Measures BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL 
FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE 
OF Master of Science  
 
   
  
Tamera R. Schneider, Ph.D. 
Thesis Director 
 
   
  
John M. Flach, Ph.D. 
Department Chair 
Committee on 
Final Examination 
 
 
 
Tamera R. Schneider, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Gary N. Burns, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Martin P. Gooden, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Andrew T. Hsu, Ph.D. 
Dean, School of Graduate Studies  
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Riffle, Rebecca Rae. M.S., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2011. 
The Relationship of Personalized and Traditional IATs with Explicit Attitude and 
Behavioral Measures. 
 
 
 
 
Researchers suggest that the Implicit Association Test (IAT) is structurally flawed, 
allowing contamination of responses that are influenced by stereotypical associations.  
This research investigated the use of a personalized IAT (PIAT) to reduce extrapersonal 
associations.  The IAT and the PIAT were adapted to measure unconscious gender bias in 
science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields.  Explicit gender bias 
was measured by self-reports and a new measure, the Instant Uncontrollable Reactions 
(IUR) questionnaire.  Partial support was found for the PIAT-explicit attitudes 
relationship reflecting less gender bias than the IAT-explicit attitudes relationship.  It was 
expected that the PIAT-IUR relationship would show less gender bias than the IAT-IUR 
relationship, but this was not supported.  However, the relationship between the IUR and 
explicit attitude and behaviors yielded many significant results.  The present study adds 
support for the PIAT, introduces the use the IUR, and provides implications for reducing 
gender bias in the STEM workplace.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Researchers have studied the attitude-behavior relationship since the early 1900’s 
(LaPiere, 1934).  In most studies, self-report measures are used to estimate the validity 
and consistency of attitudes and then examine their relationship to behaviors (Greenwald, 
Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Han, Czellar, Olson, & Fazio, 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  
However, self-reports capture only explicit (i.e., conscious) attitudes (Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001).  The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a measure designed to detect 
implicit (i.e., unconscious) attitudes (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and has 
been used frequently to measure prejudice, social identity, and levels of self-esteem 
(Olson & Fazio, 2004).  The IAT assesses attitudes based on the categorization of target 
items and uses the response latency as an index of the strength of the automatic 
associations (Greenwald et al., 2003; Han et al., 2010).  Associations that closely reflect 
an individual’s implicit attitudes (e.g. flower and pleasant vs. insect and unpleasant) are 
responded to faster than associations that do not reflect an individual’s attitudes (e.g. 
flower and unpleasant vs. insect and pleasant). 
 Researchers debate whether the IAT captures extrapersonal associations, which 
refers to irrelevant information of a social or cultural nature such as stereotypes, instead 
of implicit attitudes (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Societal pressures 
and influences can affect how individuals explicitly evaluate a target object, causing a 
mismatch between their implicitly held evaluations and their behavior (Han et al., 2010; 
Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Due to these potential problems with the IAT (e.g., capturing 
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extrapersonal associations), Olson and Fazio (2004) developed a personalized version of 
the IAT (PIAT) to measure implicit attitudes in a way that is more aligned with assessing 
personal attitudes.  This research examined the relationship between the PIAT and IAT 
with explicit attitude measures and behaviors in the domain of gender bias toward 
scientists in the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. 
Attitude-Behavior Inconsistency 
 LaPiere (1934) conducted an experiment in which he travelled across the western 
United States along with a Chinese couple.  Along the way, they stopped at various hotels 
and restaurants and found only one out of 200 businesses that overtly discriminated 
against the Chinese couple.  Six months after the journey, LaPiere sent a letter to each of 
the 200 establishment owners, asking if they would serve Chinese guests.  Ninety-two 
percent of the owners responded that they would not serve Chinese patrons, even though 
the majority had during the journey with LaPiere (Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldson, 2005; 
Perry, Gillespie & Parker, 1976).  Since detection of this attitude-behavior inconsistency, 
scientists have examined attitude theory and attempted to explain why the discrepancy 
exists between attitudes and subsequent behaviors (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; Han et al., 
2010; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982).  This early study led researchers to investigate the 
attitude-behavior relationship in various domains such as voting (Fazio & Williams, 
1986), choosing to engage in social situations that are consistent with personal beliefs 
(DeBono & Snyder, 1995; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982), and racial and gender prejudice 
(Nosek et al., 2009; Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
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The Attitude Construct 
 Explicit attitudes are conscious, based on recent experiences, and accessible in 
memory (McConnell & Leibold, 2001).  They reflect how positive or negative a person 
feels about a target object (Jaccard, Radecki, Wilson, & Dittus, 1995).  These attitudes 
are intentional thoughts or feelings.  However, they are subject to normative pressures 
such as demand effects and social desirability concerns, especially when the attitude 
object is controversial (e.g., same-sex marriage, abortion, politics; McConnell & Leibold, 
2001; Rudman, 2004).  In many situations, people care about what others think of them 
and will endorse attitudes similar to those they care about.  Whereas explicit attitudes 
reflect the intentional, deliberate component of how one feels about a target object, 
implicit attitudes reflect automatic, unconscious associations about a target object. 
 Implicit attitudes are involuntary evaluations of an attitude object that are made 
evident by behaviors or judgments (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; 
Rudman, 2004).  These attitudes happen automatically before a person has had time to 
consciously think about a target object and are the foundation for later appraisals and 
behaviors (Rudman, 2004).  For example, women who were raised to endorse the content 
of fairy tales may, on an implicit level, expect their mate to possess chivalric and 
otherwise heroic qualities.  Another example is the long-standing prominence of negative 
attitudes toward minorities.  These attitudes are likely to remain even when society views 
minority and majority groups as equal (Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002).  People 
may attempt to consciously alter their explicit beliefs to be contrary to these automatic 
associations, but may still internalize more negative connotations generally held toward 
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minorities.  Individuals may not even be aware of, or are not willing to admit, that they 
possess a particular prejudice.   
 This distinction between implicit and explicit attitudes was explored in research 
with minority groups (Livingston, 2002; Rudman et al., 2002).  Livingston (2002) studied 
perceived negativity toward minority groups and found that Black participants’ social 
standing had an influence on their in-group bias.  This perceived negativity had a positive 
correlation with explicit attitudes, but a negative correlation with implicit attitudes.  
Compared to Blacks who believed that Whites liked their group, Blacks who believed 
that Whites did not like their group reported a strong pro-Black bias on explicit measures, 
but had a pro-White bias on implicit measures.  In another study, Rudman et al. (2002) 
found that those with a lower cultural status (i.e. poor, overweight) showed a significant 
preference toward the higher status group (i.e., rich, thin).  For example, when Christians 
were perceived as higher in status than Jews, Jews associated Christians with positive 
attributes and Jews with negative attributes.  These findings suggest that minorities with 
the lowest social status are inclined to undervalue their group and unconsciously 
legitimize the supremacy of the dominant group. 
Attitude Measurement 
 There are many ways to measure attitudes, with self-reports being the most 
popular way to measure explicit attitudes.  Fazio and Williams (1986) gave voting age 
residents questionnaires to assess their attitudes regarding the 1984 presidential election.  
Voter attitudes about the candidates were explicit and therefore easy to measure with a 
questionnaire.  Attitudes were a significant predictor of voting behavior for both Reagan 
and Mondale, yet participants’ attitudes about Reagan were much more predictive of their 
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voting behavior due to the prevalence of President Reagan in the media.  Explicit attitude 
measures were designed to measure easily accessible attitudes.  However, while self-
reports are dependable in temperate domains, they may not be as reliable with 
controversial topics (Fazio, 2005). 
 The directness of explicit attitude measures for controversial topics can cause 
construct validity concerns due to social desirability and experimenter demand effects 
(Wilson, Linsey, & Schooler, 2000).  Those concerned with social desirability attempt to 
maximize their socially favorable traits and minimize their socially unfavorable traits 
(DeMaio, 1984).  Self-reports allow people time to think about their answers and present 
themselves in whatever way they desire.  Given a controversial topic, those high in social 
desirability might be less likely to report their true attitudes and instead endorse attitudes 
that they think society or the experimenter holds. 
 The present study examined a new explicit attitude measure that might reduce the 
effects of social desirability.  The Instant Uncontrollable Reactions (IUR) questionnaire 
was designed by Zanna and colleagues to assess automatic reactions by assuring 
participants that involuntary negative reactions to situations are normal (R. Fazio, 
personal communication, December 8, 2009).  Stereotypes, which are activated 
automatically and almost instantaneously, exist in all cultures and the purpose of the IUR 
was to capture these split-second reactions.  The IUR attempted to remove the effect of 
social desirability by asking for the initial response to an item, whether the response was 
positive or negative.  To help counter the social influences on explicit measures, 
researchers also use indirect implicit measures and look for a relationship between the 
explicit and implicit measures.   
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 Research suggests that implicit and explicit attitudes are independent of each 
other and are assessing different attitudes, yet still have a relationship with one another 
(Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001; Nosek, 2005).  The strength of the 
implicit-explicit relationship varies across domains, explaining the range in correlations 
(i.e., no correlation to moderate correlation) between implicit and explicit attitude 
measures (Nosek, 2005).  Attitudes that are at odds with a person’s explicit beliefs can be 
prompted automatically, suggesting that multiple processes are being used to assess a 
target object.  Consequently, measures assessing implicit and explicit attitudes are 
typically correlated with each other to assess their level of convergence.  However, 
because implicit attitudes are unconscious, they cannot be measured with self-reports due 
to the directness of these types of tests (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  Indirect measures, 
typically based on projective or reaction time tasks, are needed to tap into these 
unconscious beliefs.  Explicit measures assess an appraisal after intentional control 
processes have been given the chance to modify a response, whereas implicit measures 
assess the appraisal before intentional control processes commence (Nosek, 2005).  One 
of the most widely used implicit attitude measures today is the IAT.  
The Implicit Association Test 
 Greenwald et al. (1998) designed the IAT to measure implicit attitudes by 
capturing the automatic associations an individual has toward target objects. The IAT 
measures the strength of an implicit attitude by using reaction time to assess how quickly 
and accurately an individual can associate an object (e.g., an insect or a flower) with an 
evaluative attribute (e.g., pleasant or unpleasant words; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  The 
IAT works best with concepts that are highly associated.  For example, the sorting tasks 
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are easier when the concepts require a compatible response, such as categorizing items 
related to flower and pleasant or insect and unpleasant, than when concepts require an 
incompatible response, such as categorizing items related to flower and unpleasant or 
insect and pleasant (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Research has shown that the IAT is not 
biased by the test-taker’s familiarity with the target words used in the test (Dasgupta, 
McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000) and is adaptable to many categories that are 
capable of triggering attitudes (e.g., weapons vs. harmless objects, young vs. old, 
disabled vs. abled; Greenwald et al., 1998; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). 
 The IAT is popular with both the scientific community and the general public 
because it is easy to administer and has had a large amount of press coverage (Karpinski 
& Hilton, 2001).  It is adaptable for many research functions (Nosek & Hansen, 2008) 
and even has its own website.  Project Implicit, the international IAT Website 
(https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit), is a virtual laboratory where visitors can take over 
90 types of IATs measuring various political issues, prejudice, and sex biases so people 
can discover their own implicit biases.  There have been over 4.5 million online tests 
taken since 1998 when Project Implicit began and there are 44 researchers listed on the 
Project Implicit Team. 
 IAT Procedure.  The IAT is a categorization task designed so that there is only 
one correct category for each item (Greenwald et al., 1998).  For example, in the racial 
IAT participants are presented with typically Black and White names (e.g., Tyrone, 
Hank) and pleasant and unpleasant words (e.g., love, stink).  The participants are tested 
when the categories are combined.  The compatible task involves associating White 
names with pleasant words and Black names with unpleasant words.  The incompatible 
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task involves associating White names with unpleasant words and Black names with 
pleasant words.  Participants are given error feedback if they categorize incorrectly (e.g., 
a red “X” appears on the screen to prompt the participant to choose the other option).  For 
example, if a participant is given the compatible task and pairs Tyrone with White or love 
with unpleasant, they receive an error.  IAT scores are based on the comparison of 
response times obtained when comparing compatible versus incompatible pairings.  
When the task is done, participants who responded more quickly to Black and pleasant 
than White and pleasant would be said to have more positive associations with Blacks 
than Whites.  Alternatively, participants who responded quicker to White and pleasant 
than to Black and pleasant are said to have more positive associations with Whites than 
Blacks.    
 Potential Problems with the IAT.  Since the inception of the IAT there have 
been debates concerning the ability of the IAT to measure implicit attitudes (Blanton et 
al., 2009; DeHouwer, 2001; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  According to DeHouwer (2001), 
IAT participants seek out the specific information in the target words that is needed to 
correctly categorize the item.  For example, if the IAT categories are “man scientist” and 
“woman scientist,” a participant seeing the stimulus item “Mary, the physicist” would 
search for the gender term only (i.e., Mary) instead of considering the entire item.  To test 
this, DeHouwer conducted a British-foreigner IAT, using both positive and negative 
“British” (e.g., the Queen Mother, Margaret Thatcher) and “foreigner” (e.g., Einstein, 
Hitler) items.  The results showed that the British category was more associated with 
pleasant items whereas the foreigner category was more associated with unpleasant items 
because the categories forced the items to be construed as belonging to only one 
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respective category.  Because foreigner and unpleasant were one of the compatible 
conditions, making British and pleasant the other compatible condition, Einstein was 
compatible with unpleasant.  As DeHouwer suggested, the membership of the name 
Einstein in the foreigner category is what mattered most to participants, so once the 
information needed in the target item was found, the item was categorized and forgotten 
about.  This categorization issue is not the only problem occurring with the IAT. 
 Karpinski and Hilton (2001) suggested that IAT results are influenced by 
environmental associations, which are situational associations an individual has been 
exposed to that are irrelevant to a personalized attitude toward the target object.  
Karpinski and Hilton were not convinced that the IAT measures the unconscious attitudes 
of participants.  Rather, it may measure attitudes that are under the influence of 
environmental learning.  They conducted three studies that systematically tested for 
environmental associations and investigated the relationship between the IAT and explicit 
attitude measures.  In Study 1, participants completed a flower-insect IAT and explicit 
attitude measures.  There was no relationship between the IAT and explicit attitude 
measures, suggesting that the IAT and explicit attitude measures are independent of each 
other. 
 Their second study examined the relationship of the IAT and explicit attitude 
measures to consumer choice behavior (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  In one condition, 
participants completed an apple-candy bar IAT and explicit attitude measures, and were 
then to choose either an apple or a candy bar.  In the other condition, participants 
completed only an apple-candy bar IAT before choosing either an apple or a candy bar.  
Once again, there was no relationship between the IAT and explicit attitude measures, 
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further suggesting that they are separate constructs.  However, the explicit attitude 
measures predicted behavior, whereas the IAT did not.  The explicit measures revealed 
the same preference for apples, candy bars, or both.  The IAT revealed a high preference 
for apples, yet less than half of the participants chose an apple.  To explain this 
difference, it was suggested that the IAT could be more predictive of unconscious 
behaviors rather than behaviors that involve selection (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). 
 Study 3 was designed specifically to test the environmental association model 
using a youth-elderly IAT (Karpinski & Hilton, 2001).  According to the model, repeated 
exposure to associations between concepts (i.e., compatible concept = youth and good; 
incompatible concept = elderly and good) would affect IAT scores, but explicit attitudes 
would not be changed.  There was no relationship between the IAT and explicit attitude 
measures.  However, the IAT revealed an elderly bias when presented with the 
incompatible manipulation and a youth bias when presented with the compatible 
manipulation, whereas explicit attitudes were not influenced by the manipulation.  IAT 
scores being affected by the manipulation provided some support that environmental 
associations can influence and contaminate the IAT.  Karpinski and Hilton created the 
term environmental associations, whereas other researchers (Han et al., 2010; Olson & 
Fazio, 2004) refer to these contaminants of the IAT as extrapersonal associations.   
The Influence of Extrapersonal Associations 
 Similar to environmental associations, an extrapersonal association is knowledge 
that is relevant to the target object, but irrelevant to the individual’s personal evaluation 
of the object (Han et al., 2010).  This information is stored in memory, but has been 
deemed either inconsequential, not in accordance with one’s personal preferences, or is 
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believed to be false.  For example, an individual with an aversion to spiders likely 
developed this attitude as a consequence of an incident with a spider at some point.  
Reinforcement of the aversion will occur each time the individual avoids close proximity 
to a spider.  Positive knowledge the individual has about spiders or having close friends 
who like spiders are extrapersonal associations.  They are available in memory, but have 
no impact on the person’s attitude about spiders.   
 Extrapersonal associations may influence implicit attitudes, depending on how the 
latter are measured.  Berdik, Wax, and Tetlock (2007) found that because negative 
stereotypes of African-Americans already exist in the United States, they can influence 
implicit attitude measures.  As a result, there are individuals who discriminate, yet deny 
that they are prejudiced.  On the other hand, some individuals may be aware of societal 
stereotypes, yet are not personally prejudiced or do not actually discriminate.  This 
illustrates how certain attitudes and behaviors can be consciously controllable.  Some 
researchers suspect that the IAT measures extrapersonal associations, and may not reflect 
an individual’s true attitudes (Han et al., 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  
 Societal influences and persuasive messages can be compelling and influence 
attitudes (Han et al., 2010).  Interactions that contribute to personal attitudes can occur on 
individual, communal, and national levels.  It is when individual attitudes differ from 
cultural and societal views that these views become extrapersonal in nature (Han et al., 
2010; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  A personalized version of the IAT was created to minimize 
the effects of these extrapersonal associations. 
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Personalizing the IAT 
 Olson and Fazio (2004) created the personalized IAT (PIAT) in an attempt to 
reduce the explicit demand put upon participants to categorize items in accordance with 
stereotypes.  Specifically, they addressed procedural problems with the IAT and modified 
category labels in an attempt to reduce the influence of attitude-irrelevant information on 
implicit attitudes (Han et al., 2010; Olson, Crawford, & Devlin, 2009; Olson & Fazio, 
2004).  One problem with the IAT procedure is that it provides error feedback when a 
participant makes a mistake, suggesting that a standard, and typically stereotypical (e.g., 
flower = pleasant), response is necessary.  The error feedback was removed from the 
PIAT, thereby decreasing the sense of a requirement for standard responding.  The PIAT 
also replaces the “pleasant” and “unpleasant” category labels used in the IAT with “I 
like” and “I don’t like.” These changes were intended to focus attention on personal likes 
and dislikes while categorizing (Han et al., 2010; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  The ambiguity 
of the IAT category labels leave them open to interpretation and allow the activation of 
any accessible information in memory, rather than personal attitudes, to drive the 
categorization task (Han et al., 2010).  Accessible information may not be consistent with 
the personal attitudes of the participant.  By modifying the category labels to “I like” and 
“I don’t like,” the participant will not have to wonder whose perspective to consider 
when categorizing (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  The category labels and error feedback likely 
facilitated contamination of IAT results by increasing the accessibility of extrapersonal 
associations. 
 Four studies were conducted by Olson and Fazio (2004) to provide evidence 
supporting the modifications to the IAT.  In Study 1, participants took both a race IAT 
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and PIAT.  For the PIAT, the stimulus items that were categorized were changed to 
idiosyncratic items that had no obvious normative appraisal (e.g., coffee, storms, garlic).  
Since the stimulus items were not identical in both IATs, they could not be compared.  
Response latencies were slower for the PIAT due to the use of non-normative stimulus 
items.  They were not as easy to categorize as items that are universally pleasant or 
unpleasant.  However, compared to the IAT, the PIAT showed significantly less 
negativity toward Blacks, using Greenwald et al.’s (1998) original scoring procedure.  
The results were confirmed upon using Greenwald et al.’s (2003) improved scoring 
algorithm, which is used in the present study (see Method section below).  These findings 
show that the PIAT is successful at reducing the amount of racial prejudice for this type 
of implicit attitude test. 
 The second study extended Study 1 by making two adjustments: a between-
subjects design was employed, and the IAT and PIAT used identical stimuli (i.e., 
universally pleasant and unpleasant items; Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Participants were 
randomly assigned to complete either the IAT or PIAT.  As with Study 1, compared to 
the IAT, the PIAT revealed significantly less racial prejudice using Greenwald et al.’s 
(1998) original scoring procedure.  However, there were no significant IAT/ PIAT 
differences in explicit attitudes using Greenwald et al.’s (2003) algorithm.  Interestingly, 
participants given the PIAT responded with comparable reaction times as those taking the 
IAT, yet the PIAT reflected a reduction of prejudice.  These results suggest that the 
change in error feedback and the “I like’ and “I don’t like” labels induce a level of 
personalization for the PIAT and effectively attenuates the effects of extrapersonal 
associations. 
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 Explicit attitude and behavioral measures were introduced in Study 3, which 
predicted stronger correlations of these measures with the PIAT than the IAT (Olson & 
Fazio, 2004).  Participants completed an apple-candy bar IAT or PIAT and explicit 
attitude measures, indexing favorable attitudes toward apples and candy bars.  As in 
Study 1, the stimulus items differed for the IAT (e.g., freedom, abuse) and the PIAT (e.g., 
Snickers, cider).  The PIAT correlated significantly with the explicit attitude measures 
using Greenwald et al.’s (1998) scoring method and the updated algorithm (Greenwald et 
al., 2003).  However, the IAT correlated only weakly with all of the explicit attitude 
measures.  Three of the six explicit attitude measures revealed a significant preference for 
apples over candy bars, although all showed at least a small preference for apples.  
Participants completing the IAT had a greater preference for apples over candy bars.  In 
contrast, the PIAT revealed equal preference for apples or candy bars, suggesting that 
participants’ personal preference of apples or candy bars was not subject to social 
desirability effects. 
 Their final study aimed to extend the findings of the PIAT-explicit attitude 
correlations to another area (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  They expected to demonstrate that 
the personalized category labels and removal of error feedback were sufficient enough to 
increase the correlation of the PIAT with explicit attitudes.  Participants completed an 
IAT or PIAT, explicit attitude and behavioral intention measures about voting behavior 
during the 2000 presidential election.  The PIAT had larger significant correlations with 
all of the explicit attitude measures than the IAT using the original and new scoring 
procedures (Greenwald et al., 1998; Greenwald et al., 2003, respectively).  The PIAT was 
also significantly correlated with behavioral intention using both scoring algorithms, 
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whereas the IAT was not.  Voting behavior did not correlate significantly with either 
implicit measure, but was stronger for the PIAT than the IAT.  This study confirmed the 
expectation that the PIAT would reduce the influence of extrapersonal associations by 
correlating more strongly with explicit attitudes, behavioral intentions, and voting 
behaviors. 
 In summary, Olson and Fazio’s (2004) research on modifications to the IAT 
revealed that the IAT has the potential to be influenced by extrapersonal associations.  
Both within- and between-subjects studies have found that extrapersonal associations 
influence the IAT by evoking stronger biases toward societal stereotypes.  Throughout 
the studies, error rates for the IAT and the PIAT were equivalent, suggesting that 
response accuracy was not a factor for significant differences between the IAT and PIAT 
scores.  The two keystrokes needed to categorize items were used equally throughout the 
experiment, ensuring that both were used.  Studies 1 and 3 used different stimulus items 
for the IAT and PIAT, whereas Studies 2 and 4 used the same items for the IAT and 
PIAT.  Consequently, the response latencies for the PIAT in Studies 1 and 3 were larger 
than the latencies for the IAT.  This produced a main effect for IAT type (i.e., the IAT or 
PIAT) in Study 1 only.  Despite the larger response times, the PIAT resulted in less 
prejudiced attitudes and higher correlations with explicit attitude measures.  These 
findings show that the combination of changing category labels and removing error 
feedback is enough to reduce extrapersonal associations in the IAT, making the PIAT a 
more viable candidate for assessing personal implicit attitudes. 
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The Present Research 
 The present study used the IAT and PIAT to investigate implicit attitudes about 
men and women STEM scientists (i.e., college professors), and were administered in an 
academic setting.  Nosek et al. (2009) gathered data from Project Implicit and discovered 
that people generally have a stronger association of men with science than women with 
science.  These stereotypes may be one reason fewer women are drawn to STEM careers 
(Bilimoria, Joy, & Liang, 2008; Nosek et al., 2009).  Women who believe that women do 
not perform well in science and mathematics are less interested in pursuing these classes 
or careers.  This is not to say that women do not succeed in STEM fields, but there are 
clear sex differences in STEM involvement and performance.  The difference in women’s 
success, involvement, and performance is at the academic and organizational level 
(Bilimoria et al., 2008).  Even though a larger number of women are earning advanced 
science and engineering degrees, these women are not entering the workforce.  For the 
present study, we investigated a gender-science bias theme for all measures.   
 The correlations of the IAT and PIAT with explicit attitude and behavioral 
measures were evaluated to determine which implicit test may be more reflective of 
gender bias.  It was expected that, because stereotypes about men and women scientists 
exist, there would be a difference between the implicit measures, which are articulated in 
the following hypotheses:  
 Hypothesis 1: The PIAT-explicit attitudes correlations would reflect less gender  
 bias than the IAT-explicit attitudes correlations. 
 Hypothesis 2: The PIAT-behavioral measures correlations would reflect less  
 gender bias than the IAT-behavioral measures correlations. 
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 Hypothesis 3: The PIAT-IUR correlations would reflect less gender bias than the  
 IAT-IUR correlations. 
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II. METHOD 
Participants and Design 
Participants included 52 introductory psychology students (Caucasian (n = 20, 
38%), African-American (n = 8, 15%), Asian or Pacific Islander (n = 3, 6%), 
Hispanic/Latino (n = 1, 2%), and 20 (38%) of mixed or unreported ethnic background) at 
a Midwestern university from STEM related majors.  The sample consisted of 31 women 
(60%) and 21 men (40%) with a mean age of 21 (see Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations).  The sample included a higher number of freshmen (n = 16, 31%), whereas 
seven were sophomores (14%), nine were juniors (17%), three were seniors (6%), and 
two reported other (4%).  Past research reporting correlations of the IAT and PIAT with 
explicit measures were used to determine power (significant correlation ranges were .32 
to .67 and .38 to .69; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001, Olson & Fazio, 2004).  Participation in 
the study was voluntary and all participants received partial course credit.  This research 
was funded by the National Science Foundation (ADVANCE HRD 081098) and was part 
of a larger study.  The present study employed a between-subjects design where 
participants were randomly assigned to their IAT or PIAT task group. 
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Table 1  
Means (Standard Deviations) for Major Variables and Demographics for the Sample and 
by Task Condition 
Variable Sample (N = 52)        IAT (n = 26)     PIAT (n = 26) 
Age 21.05 (4.00) 20.75 (2.57) 21.29 (4.87) 
Sex 1.41 (.50) 1.32 (.48) 1.50 (.51) 
IAT/PIAT D score  -.37 (.41) -.07 (.39) 
IUR  3.69 (.62) 3.86 (.59) 3.51 (.60) 
Explicit measures    
     Good 4.21 (.79) 4.40 (.60) 4.03 (.92) 
     Favorable (10-point) 8.63 (1.52) 8.58 (1.45) 8.69 (1.62) 
     Associate with STEM 2.96 (.85) 2.83 (.56) 3.10 (1.05) 
     Likeable 3.68 (.75) 3.69 (.66) 3.67 (.84) 
Donations .20 (.74) .08 (.27) .31 (1.00) 
Volunteer hours .58 (1.49) .31 (1.09) .85 (1.78) 
Brochure taken .54 (.50) .54 (.51) .54 (.51) 
Behavioral Composite 1.31 (1.88) .92 (1.47) 1.70 (2.17) 
Note. Sex, 1 = women, 2 = men. 
Materials 
The IAT.  Participants categorized a variety of items using Inquisit 3.0 software.  
Procedures were adapted from Greenwald et al. (1998).  There were 7 blocks consisting 
of 180 trials total (see Table 2).  A set of instructions presented on the computer screen 
preceded each block informing participants that they would be presented with a set of 
words to classify into groups, where the category labels were located, and the two 
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keyboard keys to use for responding (I and E).  On a given trial, a stimulus item was 
presented in the center of the screen.  The participant categorized the word by pressing 
either the E key if it belonged in the category on the left side of the screen or the I key if 
it belonged in the category on the right.  Participants received feedback (i.e., a red X 
through the incorrectly categorized stimulus item that disappeared once the correct 
response was selected) in every block for incorrect responses.   
Table 2 
Sequence of Trial Blocks for the STEM Scientist (Man vs. Woman) IAT 
Block 
# of 
trials Function 
Items assigned to left 
category 
Items assigned to right 
category 
1 20 Practice Man scientist Woman scientist 
2 20 Practice Pleasant Unpleasant 
3 20 Practice Pleasant + Man scientist Unpleasant + Woman scientist 
4 40 Test Pleasant + Man scientist Unpleasant + Woman scientist 
5 20 Practice Woman scientist Man scientist 
6 20 Practice Pleasant + Woman scientist Unpleasant + Man scientist 
7 40 Test Pleasant + Woman scientist Unpleasant + Man scientist 
Note. The PIAT replaced the categories pleasant and unpleasant with “I like” and “I don’t like” 
respectively. 
Blocks 1 and 5 were for practice categorizing “man scientist” (e.g., Chemistry 
Professor Christopher Smith) and “woman scientist” (e.g., Biochemistry Professor 
Christine Reed; see Appendix A for all stimulus items; first name stimuli from 
www.ssa.gov, profession stimuli from R. Fazio & T. Schneider, personal communication, 
December 15, 2009).  Block 2 was for practice categorizing items as “pleasant” (e.g., 
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laughter) and “unpleasant” (e.g., agony).  The items presented (adapted from Greenwald 
et al., 1998; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002) were universally pleasant or unpleasant.  
Block 3 was practice with combined categories (e.g., man scientist and unpleasant) and 
Block 4 was a test of Block 3.  Block 5 reversed the Block 1 category labels.  Block 6 
was designed as practice with the combined categories and Block 7 was a test of Block 6.  
Stimulus items were randomly set for each trial.  The block categories were randomized 
so that 50% of the time, the category labels from Blocks 1, 3, and 4 were switched with 
Blocks 5, 6, and 7, respectively.  This allowed half of the participants to receive the 
compatible items (i.e., man scientist and pleasant vs. woman scientist and unpleasant) 
first, and half to receive the compatible items last.   
The IAT was scored using the improved algorithm by Greenwald et al. (2003; see 
Table 1 for mean and standard deviation).  All trials from Blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7 (the 
combined category blocks) were used.  Trials with response latency over 10,000 
milliseconds (ms) were eliminated and replaced with the block mean.  Latency more than 
10,000 ms indicated the participant was distracted or did not understand the task 
directions.  Participants with latency less than 300 ms more than 10% of the time were 
eliminated as well.  Latency less than 300 ms was not enough time to read, comprehend, 
and categorize an item (Greenwald et al., 2003).  The optimal response time was between 
300 and 3,000 ms.  A mean for each block was computed using correct response 
latencies.  A pooled standard deviation was computed for Blocks 3 and 6 (the practice 
blocks with combined categories), and for Blocks 4 and 7 (the repeated blocks with 
combined categories).  Two mean differences were computed: Block 6 minus Block 3, 
and Block 7 minus Block 4.  Each difference was divided by its associated pooled 
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standard deviation and the two quotients were averaged to determine a final score.  The 
final D score was the difference in average latency between the compatible (e.g., Blocks 
6 and 7) and incompatible (e.g., Blocks 3 and 4) conditions (Greenwald et al., 1998), 
which assessed the participant’s implicit attitude toward the categories being studied.   
The difference between the present D score and Cohen’s d (Cohen, 1977) is that 
the standard deviation in the denominator of the D was calculated using scores in both 
IAT conditions, ignoring the association with either condition, while the d standard 
deviation is a pooled within-treatment standard deviation.  Given the category ratings in 
the proposed IAT, higher scores indicated more positive attitudes toward women 
scientists.  For example, higher scores in the woman scientist/pleasant condition than the 
man scientist/unpleasant condition indicated a stronger association between women 
scientists and pleasant items, thus a more positive attitude toward women scientists. 
The PIAT.  The materials, procedures, and scoring for the PIAT were similar to 
the IAT (see Table 1 for mean and standard deviation).  However, the labels pleasant and 
unpleasant were replaced with “I like” and “I don’t like.”  Participants received feedback 
for incorrect responses only in Blocks 1 and 5 to ensure they understood the 
categorization instructions.  This method differs from the one used by Olson and Fazio 
(2004) in that they did not provide error feedback for any trials to encourage 
personalization of the tasks.   
Explicit Attitude Measures.  Participants completed explicit attitude measures 
toward men and women scientists (adapted from Olson & Fazio, 2004; see Appendix B 
for full listing).  Explicit measures include the following: five semantic differential items 
(e.g., Bad-Good, using a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (Bad) to 5 (Good)), a feeling 
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thermometer (“Please rate on a scale of 1 (unfavorable) to 10 (favorable) how you feel 
about the following groups.”), an attitude measure (e.g., “I dislike women scientists.” 
using a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)), and 
an intention measure (e.g., “I have taken a science course from a male professor,” with 
the answer options yes or no).  Appropriate items were reverse-scored so that higher 
scores reflect a more favorable attitude toward women scientists. 
A Principal Axis Factor analysis (PAF) with a Varimax rotation of the 15 Likert-
type scale items from the explicit attitude survey was conducted.  Using the criterion of 
Eigenvalues exceeding 1, it was determined that six underlying constructs existed.  To be 
included in a factor, an item needed to load high (> .40) and have lower loadings on all 
other factors (> .30; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1989; see Table 1 for means and standard 
deviations).   
Three of the semantic differential items loaded onto a factor, relating to feelings 
about women scientists, and was labeled “Good.”  It consists of the items Bad – Good, 
Pleasant – Unpleasant (reverse-scored), and Wise – Foolish (reverse-scored) and was 
reliable (IAT group α = .80, PIAT group α = .85).   
The two items that loaded onto another factor identified gender associations of 
scientists (i.e., “I associate women with the area of science,” “I associate men with the 
science domain” (reverse-scored)).  This factor was labeled “Associate with STEM,” but 
only the PIAT group (r = .63) was reliable (IAT group r = .13), using r = .40 as the 
criterion.   
Two items loaded onto another factor and identified likeable properties of women 
scientists.  It includes the items Ugly – Beautiful and Awful – Nice (IAT group r = .37, 
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PIAT group r = .58) and was labeled “Likeable.” Other factors determined by PAF were 
not used because their use in the factor analysis was not in accordance with how the items 
were used in this study or were deemed inconsequential.  The one single item that was 
used favorability of women scientists and was labeled “Favorable” (i.e., “Please rate on a 
scale on 1 (unfavorable) to 10 (favorable) how you feel about the following group: 
Women scientists”). 
Demographics.  Participants’ sex, age, rank, and ethnic background were 
collected. 
Behavioral Measures.  Participants were invited to donate money (i.e., 
Donations) to the Women in Science Giving Circle, an on-campus organization designed 
to enhance the education and professional success of STEM (and Medicine) women 
students and faculty.  Participants were also offered the opportunity to donate time (i.e., 
Volunteer hours) to the organization via a sign-up sheet, as well as take a brochure (i.e., 
Brochures taken) explaining the Giving Circle.  The researcher was able to see and record 
participants’ behavior.  A composite score was computed from these three behavioral 
measures by assigning a “1” to each behavior completed and summing these (see Table 1 
for means and standard deviations). 
Instant Uncontrollable Reactions Questionnaire.  Participants completed a 12-
item IUR (R. H. Fazio, personal communication, December 8, 2009; see Appendix C for 
full item listing; see Table 1 for means and standard deviations) to explicitly assess 
immediate reactions to questions involving interactions with women scientists (IAT 
group α = .67, PIAT group α = .70).  An example question is “When encountering an 
intelligent woman scientist, I have, for a split second, been surprised.”  Participants rated 
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items on a 5-point rating scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).  
Appropriate items were reverse-scored so that higher scores reflected a more favorable 
attitude toward women scientists.   
Procedure 
Participants were run individually by a female research assistant (RA) wearing a 
white laboratory coat to standardize gender and appearance.  The RA collected the 
participants from a waiting room and brought them to a table in the laboratory.  After 
obtaining informed consent, participants were seated at the computer station and 
informed that they were participating in a categorization task.  Participants were 
randomly assigned to complete either the IAT or PIAT and received all instructions from 
a computer screen.  All responses were provided and recorded via the computer 
keyboard.  After the categorization task, participants were administered the IUR 
questionnaire and then the explicit attitude measures.  After completion, the RA asked the 
participants what they believed the purpose of the study was and invited them to donate 
money, time, and/or take a brochure for the Women in Science Giving Circle.  On their 
way out of the laboratory, the RA debriefed all participants. 
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III. RESULTS 
Analysis of Error Rates  
 Participants received error feedback throughout the IAT, but for only two blocks 
during the PIAT.  The error rate for the present study for the both the IAT and PIAT 
appeared to be similar to past research.  Greenwald et al. (1998) and Karpinski and Hilton 
(2001) reported IAT error rates around 4%, whereas Nosek and Hanson (2008) averaged 
9.2% for the IAT and 11.9% for the PIAT.  For the present study, error rates for the IAT 
(M = 7.56, SD = 5.40) and PIAT (M = 5.71, SD = 5.50) were not significantly different (p 
< .20). 
 Olson and Fazio (2004) omitted participants with a 20% or more error rate.  The 
present sample included one person with an error rate of 27%, but due to the small 
sample size and the fact that the correlation patterns did not change with this person 
removed, no participants were omitted.   
Effects of IAT Condition 
 Following steps from Greenwald et al.’s (2003) improved scoring procedure, a 
block mean of raw latencies was computed for blocks 3, 4, 6, and 7.  Latencies over 
10,000 ms were replaced with their respective block mean + 600 ms.  Using these 
latencies, Blocks 3 and 4 were added together and averaged, as were latencies for Blocks 
6 and 7.  This allowed the 20 trials from practice Blocks 3 and 6 to be weighted properly 
with the 40 trials from the test Blocks 4 and 7.  The purpose of the new weighted mean 
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for the two blocks was to test for an effect when receiving either the compatible (i.e., 
woman scientist and pleasant/I like) or incompatible (i.e., woman scientist and 
unpleasant/I don’t like) items first.  These block types are referred to as woman/+ (i.e., 
compatible) and woman/- (i.e., incompatible).  The two new means were then entered 
into a 2 (condition: IAT vs. PIAT) X 2 (order: compatible first vs. incompatible first) 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) with compatible latencies (woman/+) 
versus incompatible latencies (woman/-).  
 There was a significant effect of IAT condition for woman/-, F(1, 48) = 6.83, p < 
.05, such that regardless of order, participants responded more slowly while performing 
the PIAT woman/- (M = 1230.06, SD = 373.57) relative to the IAT woman/- (M = 
1000.02, SD = 303.26).  Overall, participants were slower to respond in the woman/+ (M 
= 1209.32, SD = 376.29) relative to the woman/- (M = 1115.04, SD = 356.34) block.   
 For the traditional IAT, the mean response latency for the woman/+ (M = 
1166.69, SD = 382.26) was slower than the woman/- (M = 1000.02, SD = 303.26).  For 
the PIAT, the mean response latency for the woman/+ (M = 1251.95, SD = 372.75) was 
also slower than the woman/- (M = 1230.06, SD = 373.57).  By subtracting the mean 
response latencies of the compatible blocks from the incompatible blocks, it appears that 
the PIAT (M = 21.89, SD = .82) produced less bias toward women scientists than the IAT 
(M = 166.67, SD = 79.00), although this was not significant (p > .10).  
Explicit Attitude Measures 
 Hypothesis 1 stated that the PIAT-explicit attitudes correlations would reflect less 
gender bias than the IAT-explicit attitudes correlations.  To investigate Hypothesis 1, 
bivariate correlations were calculated between the PIAT D scores and the explicit 
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attitudes and the IAT D scores and explicit attitudes (see Table 3).  The PIAT D scores 
revealed no significant relationships with explicit attitudes, whereas the IAT D scores had 
two significant negative relationships with Good (r = -.44, p < .05) and Associate with 
STEM (r = -.39, p < .05).  For each task group, there were few significant correlations 
amongst explicit attitudes.  However, there was one significant correlation of Likeable 
with Associate with STEM for both the IAT (r = .39, p < .05) and PIAT (r = .54, p < .01) 
groups.    
Table 3  
Correlations among Explicit Attitudes, Instant Uncontrollable Reactions (IUR), and the 
IAT and PIAT D Scores by Task Group 
Variable Good Favorable 
Associate 
with 
STEM Likeable IUR 
PIAT D 
score 
Good (.80,.85) .36 .29 .30 .31 .32 
Favorable  .40* - .46* .33 .40* .06 
Associate with 
STEM .23 .15 (.23, .76) .54** .42* -.03 
Likeable .28 .27 .39*  (.54,.73)   .81** -.28 
IUR .23 .45* .48* .57** (.69, .70) -.17 
IAT D score -.44* -.14 -.39
*
 -.28 -.08          - 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05. IAT (n = 26) = bold, PIAT (n = 26) = not bold.  
Cronbach’s alphas are on the diagonal. 
 Correlation coefficients were transformed into z scores using Fisher’s z and z-
tests were conducted to test differences between PIAT-explicit attitude correlations and 
IAT-explicit attitude correlations (http://faculty.vassar.edu/lowry/rdiff.html).  A 
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significant z score demonstrates that a difference exists between the two correlation 
coefficients, which would support Hypothesis 1.  Table 4 presents z scores.  There was a 
significant difference between implicit-explicit correlations for the task groups for the 
correlation of the D scores and the explicit measure Good (z = 2.73, p < .01) and the D 
scores and the explicit measure Associate with STEM (z = 1.29, p < .05), partially 
supporting Hypothesis 1.  
Table 4 
 
Z Scores Comparing Task Groups on Explicit Attitudes, Instant Uncontrollable Reactions 
(IUR), and the IAT and PIAT D Scores 
Variable Good Favorable 
Associate 
with 
STEM Likeable IUR 
Good           
Favorable -.16            
Associate with STEM .22 1.17            
Likeable .07 .22 .65            
IUR .29 -.21 -.26 1.63*            
D score 2.73* .68 1.29* .00 -.31 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05, N = 52. A negative number denotes a larger IAT r coefficient. 
Behavioral Measures 
 Hypothesis 2 stated that the PIAT-behavioral measures correlations would reflect 
less gender bias than the IAT-behavioral measures correlations.  To investigate 
Hypothesis 2, bivariate correlations were calculated between the PIAT D scores and 
behavioral measures and the IAT D scores and behavioral measures (see Table 5).  Only 
the PIAT D scores-Donation correlation was significant (r = .40, p < .05).  Also, both 
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task groups had a few significant and marginally significant correlations amongst 
behavioral measures. 
Table 5  
Correlations among Behavioral Measures, Instant Uncontrollable Reactions (IUR), and 
the IAT and PIAT D Scores by Task Group 
Variable Donations 
Volunteer 
hours 
Brochures 
taken Composite IUR 
PIAT D 
score 
Donations  - -.09 -.21  .34
†
 -.50** .40
*
 
Volunteer hours .46** - .45*   .88**  .35
†
 -.06 
Brochure taken .27 .27         -   .51** .16 .02 
Composite .62** .92** .59**           - .10 .14 
IUR .17 .36
†
 .17  .36
†
  - -.17 
IAT D score .10 -.13 .13 -.03 -.08        - 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05, 
†
p < .10. IAT (n = 26) = bold, PIAT (n = 26) = not bold. 
 Correlation coefficients were transformed into z scores using Fisher’s z and z-
tests were conducted to determine if there was a significant difference between the task 
groups between the correlation coefficients of the behavioral measures with each other 
and the IAT and PIAT D scores (see Table 6).  There was a significant difference 
between task groups for the correlation of Donations and Volunteer hours (z = -1.99, p < 
.01), and Donations and Brochures taken (z = -1.66, p < .01).  However, Hypothesis 2 
was not supported because there were no significant differences between task groups for 
the D scores. 
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Table 6  
Z Scores Comparing Task Groups on Behavioral Measures, Instant Uncontrollable 
Reactions (IUR), and the IAT and PIAT D Scores 
Variable Donations 
Volunteer 
hours 
Brochures 
taken Composite IUR 
Donations             
Volunteer hours -1.99**                
Brochures taken -1.66** .70           
Composite -1.26 -.72 -.39               
IUR -2.44** -.04 -.03 -.94       
D scores 1.10 .24 -.38 .58   -.31 
Note. **p < .01, *p < .05, N = 52. A negative number denotes a larger IAT r coefficient. 
Instant Uncontrollable Reactions 
 Hypothesis 3 stated that the PIAT-IUR correlation would reflect less gender bias 
than the IAT-IUR correlation.  To investigate Hypothesis 3, bivariate correlations were 
calculated between the IUR and the IAT and PIAT D scores (see Table 3).  There were 
no significant correlations.  
 However, the IUR was correlated with many explicit attitude and behavioral 
measures.  Table 3 shows there were significant correlations for both task groups of the 
IUR and the explicit measures Favorable (IAT r = .40, p < .05; PIAT r = .40, p < .05), 
Associate with STEM (IAT r = .48, p < .05; PIAT r = .42, p < .05), and Likeable (IAT r 
= .57, p < .01; PIAT r = .81, p < .01).  Table 4 shows the z scores.  These revealed a 
significant task group difference for the IUR and Likeable (z = 1.63, p < .05). 
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Table 5 presents bivariate correlations of the IUR and behavioral measures.  The 
IUR had a significant negative relationship with Donations for the PIAT group (r = -.50, 
p < .01), while having only two marginal effects for the IAT group (i.e., Volunteer hours, 
Donations).  Table 6 presents z scores revealing a significant task group difference 
between the IUR and Donations (z = -2.44, p < .01). 
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IV. DISCUSSION 
 Findings somewhat predicted the hypothesis that the relationship between the 
PIAT and explicit attitudes would reflect less gender bias than that of the IAT and 
explicit attitudes.  Even though the PIAT-explicit measures correlations were not 
significant, they were less negative, than the IAT-explicit measures.  The IAT showed an 
inverse relationship with the explicit measures, suggesting that implicit attitudes fit with 
the stereotype that men are more associated with STEM fields than women, whereas 
explicit attitudes better associated women with STEM.  Moreover, the first hypothesis 
was most directly supported by significant differences between the IAT and PIAT and 
their relationship with feelings about scientists and their association with STEM fields.  
The PIAT revealed more good feelings toward women scientists and their association 
with STEM than the IAT.  These results suggest that extrapersonal associations 
contaminated the IAT scores more than the PIAT scores.    
 In addition, response latencies between the IAT and PIAT were significantly 
different.  Even though the incompatible items required less time to categorize in both the 
IAT and PIAT, the latencies in the IAT were significantly shorter.  This suggests 
influence of extrapersonal associations, which in this case, are stereotypes associating 
men with STEM fields more than women.  Participants required more time to process the 
PIAT items, suggesting the use of more time for reflection and successful personalizing 
of the categories.  However, latencies for this study were larger than those found in past 
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research.  The latency of Olson and Fazio’s (2004) experiments ranged from 669.68 ms 
(SD = 123.88) to 950.89 ms (SD = 197.28).  This may have been due to the length of the 
stimulus items in the present study.  This study used items such as “Biochemistry 
Professor Christine Reed,” whereas other studies used one word items such as “tree.”  
Then again, instead of looking at the entire stimulus item during the categorization task, 
perhaps only gender was sought out, as suggested by DeHouwer (2001).  This would 
disallow the scientist aspect of the items to be fully captured.  
 There was convergence with the IAT and liking women scientists correlation and 
the PIAT and liking women scientists correlation (r = -.28, ns for both).  This relationship 
may be explained in part by research concerning gender, self-monitoring, and 
masculinity.  Researchers found that women who can be confident and assertive, yet have 
the flexibility to use these more masculine traits only when needed, earned more 
promotions than men and other women who were more consistently masculine or 
consistently feminine (O’Neill & O’Reilly, 2010).  Women who put forth extreme 
femininity were seen as more nice, but less competent and incapable of becoming 
successful managers.  This suggests that the explicit liking of scientists may not be a 
factor that would strongly influence implicit attitudes toward them. 
 Results did not support expectations of less gender bias in the relationship 
between the PIAT and behaviors than the IAT and behaviors.  However, the PIAT 
correlated significantly with making donations, meaning that more favorable implicit 
attitudes about women scientists were related to donating to a women in science 
organization.  Even though the PIAT was correlated with one behavioral measure and had 
more positive correlations, there were no significant findings between the task groups and 
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an assumption cannot be made about the IAT or PIAT being a better predictor of 
behaviors. 
 The results found for the relationship between the PIAT and Instant 
Uncontrollable Reactions (IUR) questionnaire and the IAT and IUR were not supported, 
but the IUR correlated significantly with many explicit attitude measures.  While there 
was a significant difference between the IAT and PIAT groups for relationships between 
the IUR and liking women scientists, there were also significant relationships per task 
group with the IUR and having favorable feelings toward women scientists, and 
associating women with STEM.  It is interesting that the IUR reflects a positive bias 
toward women in science, yet has a negative relationship with donating to women in 
science organizations (in the PIAT group).  For the PIAT group, latency analyses suggest 
that more time is being used to reflect and associate women with science.  Perhaps the 
IUR illuminates automatic reactions and acknowledgment of a negative reaction could 
lead to donating more money.  To understand if this is the case, future research would be 
needed.  Results also showed positive marginal relationships between the IUR and 
volunteer hours for both the IAT and PIAT groups.  From the results of this study, it is 
clear that the IUR could be a beneficial addition to the measurement of explicit attitudes. 
 Perhaps stronger correlations between the PIAT and explicit attitudes and the IUR 
could have been obtained if the PIAT used in this study had completely omitted error 
feedback.  Nosek and Hansen (2008) reported that personalizing the category labels and 
providing no error feedback led participants to categorize the stimuli based on their 
explicit evaluation rather than the categorization rules.  Therefore, the relationship 
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between the PIAT and self-reported attitudes was enhanced.  However, feedback was 
used in the present study to ensure that the participants were aware of the task rules. 
 Order of the administration of the tasks (i.e., IAT first, then explicit attitude 
measures) may have influenced ratings on the explicit attitude measures and the IUR.  
McConnell and Leibold (2001) reported that the IAT methodology is obvious and 
sensitizes participants to the purpose of the overall study.  The authors administered the 
IAT second to decrease the chance that concerns for social desirability, instead of 
personal attitudes, would influence participants’ subsequent explicit attitudes.  Project 
Implicit also gives their explicit attitude measures before administering the IAT.   On the 
contrary, Wilson et al. (2000) stated that an explicit attitude will override an implicit one, 
called automatic overriding, if the explicit attitude is easier to retrieve from memory than 
the implicit attitude.  A large number of researchers (e.g., Han et al., 2010; Karpinski & 
Hilton, 2001; Olson & Fazio, 2004) have administered the explicit measures after the 
IAT so the explicit measures do not prime the participant to think about their attitudes 
about a particular topic before the IAT.  This exposure could filter into the IAT, 
contaminating the results.  In order to properly test this, Project Implicit could give the 
explicit measures randomly before or after the IAT.  Research could then help to discern 
whether automatic overriding does, in fact, affect the IAT. 
 In summary, the results of this study did find partial support for the use of a 
personalized version of the IAT to reduce extrapersonal associations during implicit 
attitude measuring.  This version of the IAT and PIAT, as well as implementation of the 
IUR as a new explicit attitude measure, could further our understanding about bias 
toward women scientists.  The present findings also add to the research already 
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established about the PIAT and IAT’s capabilities of measuring implicit attitudes (e.g., 
Han et al., 2010; Nosek & Hanson, 2008; Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
Limitations 
 The first limitation of this study was the small sample size.  It was estimated that 
this study would need a sample size of 46 participants per condition to have 80% power.  
However, the subject pool was restricted to STEM students within a limited participant 
pool and because this was part of a larger study, the sample size was predetermined.  It 
also could have been advantageous to measure attitudes of students who are not as 
familiar with STEM-related fields.  Even though the sample size for this research was 
small, it is important to note that the scales were reliable, and results revealed some 
expected significant relationships among measures.  
 Low statistical power may have hindered the ability to yield stronger correlations.  
The small sample size could have induced relatively low power for detecting even a 
medium effect size between the task groups.  G*Power 3.1.0 was used to conduct post 
hoc power analyses (alpha < .05, two-tailed) and find a range of power per hypothesis.  
Using the highest and lowest pair of correlations of the PIAT and IAT with explicit 
attitudes, the range of power was .77 to .05.  This makes sense considering Hypothesis 1 
was partially supported.  The range of power for the relationship between the PIAT and 
IAT and behavioral measures, was .19 to .05, while the PIAT and IAT and IUR 
relationship produced almost no power (.05).   
 Another limitation may be that the PIAT in this study gave error feedback.  Past 
research eliminated all error feedback on the PIAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004).  However, 
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there was a concern that the participants would not understand the categorization task.  
Providing error feedback may have affected the strength of our results. 
Implications and Future Research 
This research contains both theoretical and practical implications.  This study 
could be used for measuring young adults’ attitudes about women scientists.  By 
measuring young adults’ attitudes before they become scientists in a STEM field, and 
making them aware of stereotypes and social desirability demands, their workplace biases 
may be reduced.  This particular PIAT could establish a starting point by which to resolve 
the persistent gender gap in STEM fields (National Academy of Sciences, National 
Academy of Engineering, & Institute of Medicine of the National Academies, 2007).  By 
measuring young people’s views about women in STEM careers, researchers could begin 
to see what changes to make, environmentally, through persuasive messages.  Eventually, 
the information gathered from the PIAT could be used as a basis for diversity workshops 
for those in the STEM workplace. 
Currently, Project Implicit is focused exclusively on IATs.  If the Project Implicit 
team would incorporate PIAT versions of many IAT topics, the abundant sample size that 
could accumulate over the years, and in so many countries, could help to further elucidate 
differences between the IAT and the PIAT.  Perhaps the IAT is better equipped to 
measure certain attitudes, whereas the PIAT is better with other attitudes.  With the large 
sample size this website attracts, research could examine theoretical differences between 
the IAT and PIAT. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
 This research provides additional support for the use of the PIAT in measuring 
implicit attitudes by the direction of the relationships more than the significant values 
between the IAT and PIAT with the explicit attitude and behavioral measures.  The 
performance of the IUR is also an important element of this study.  The extent of its 
correlation with other explicit attitude measures cannot be ignored.  Accurate assessment 
of attitudes is required to determine factors that predict behaviors and might pose barriers 
(e.g., gender gaps in promotion, salary, retention, and occupational participation) that 
keep women excluded from the STEM workplace.  Using implicit attitude measures is 
one step toward improving gender representation and inclusion and might positively 
impact women scientists’ role in the workplace.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
(Personalized) Implicit Association Test Stimuli List 
 
Man scientist/Woman scientist stimulus items: 
 
Chemistry Professor Christopher Smith 
Biochemistry Professor Christine Reed 
David Johnson, PhD, Psychology 
Dawn Jones, PhD, Neuroscience 
Assistant Professor of Biology James Reed 
Assistant Professor of Biophysics Jennifer Jackson 
Dr. Michael Jones, Engineering 
Dr. Michelle Smith, Mechanical Engineering 
Physicist, Steven Jackson 
Astronomer, Susan Johnson 
Mark Williams, PhD, Cell Biology 
Mary Williams, PhD, Physiology 
Scott Davis, Director of Computer Science 
Stephanie Davis, Director of IT 
Dr. Timothy Miller Statistician  
Dr. Tammy Miller, Mathematician 
 
Unpleasant/Pleasant (PIAT- I don’t like/I like) stimulus items: 
 
joy , love, peace, freedom, friend, laughter, vacation, heaven  
agony, poison, abuse, failure, evil, war, crash, stink  
 
 
First name stimuli taken from Social Security website 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/babynames/ 
 
Unpleasant/Pleasant (PIAT- I don’t like/I like) stimuli from: Greenwald, McGhee, & 
Schwartz, 1998 and Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002. 
 
Professions: suggested by Drs. Russ Fazio and Tamera Schneider 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Explicit Attitude Measures 
 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please circle which number best reflects your 
beliefs. 
 
I think that women scientists are: 
Bad  1 2 3 4 5 Good 
Pleasant 1 2 3 4 5 Unpleasant 
Wise  1 2 3 4 5 Foolish 
Ugly  1 2 3 4 5 Beautiful 
Awful  1 2 3 4 5 Nice 
 
Please rate on a scale on 1 (unfavorable) to 10 (favorable) how you feel about the 
following groups. 
 
Women scientists 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 10 
Men scientists      1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 10 
 
Please rate your agreement with the following statements by circling the appropriate 
number.           
       strongly                      strongly 
       disagree disagree neutral   agree     agree 
I dislike women scientists.      1  2          3          4       5 
I would take a science course offered    
by a female professor.        1     2          3          4 5 
I dislike men scientists.         1  2          3          4 5 
I associate men with the science domain.       1  2          3          4 5 
I would take a science course offered         
by a male professor.     1  2          3          4 5 
I associate women with the area of science.      1  2          3          4 5 
 
I have taken a science course from a male professor.         Yes  No 
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I have taken a science course from a woman professor.     Yes  No 
 
Ethnic background:         ___African American                ____American Indian or Alaskan 
Native      
                                                ____Asian or Pacific Islander      ____Hispanic/Latino                                                       
        ____Caucasian (white, non Hispanic)    Other___________________ 
Age ________     
 
Class rank: ___Freshman     ___Sophomore     ___Junior     ___Senior ___Other 
 
Sex:       ____female ____male 
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APPENDIX C 
 
Instant Uncontrollable Reaction Questionnaire 
 
 Sometimes our responses (our thoughts or feelings) are consistent with our values 
and beliefs; however, other times they are not. For instance, you might find that your 
initial response to something may not be in line with how you actually feel. Situations in 
which people might experience conflicting reactions between what they 
MOMENTARILY think and what they NORMALLY think may involve interactions 
with women scientists. For example, a person may have a split second negative or 
surprised reaction when s/he learns that a woman is a scientist. To have such a reaction is 
entirely normal because we live in a society in which certain genders are stereotypically 
in traditional gender-related careers. 
  
 We are interested in the situations in which spontaneous or momentary thoughts 
might “pop” into your head despite the fact that these thoughts do not represent your true 
feelings. However, we are only interested in the experiences you have had in the last year 
or two. Please answer the following questions honestly by circling the number that 
indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with each statement. 
 
1. When encountering an intelligent woman scientist, I have, for a split second, been 
surprised. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
2. I have never involuntarily had negative thoughts about women scientists. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
3. When I learn that a woman scientist was given tenure or promoted, for a moment 
I think it is because of her gender. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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4. When I hear that a woman scientist is having career/personal issues, I might 
involuntarily think “how typical.” 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
5. At times I think, for a split second, that women scientists do not work as hard as 
they should. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
6. I have never, even for a brief moment, caught myself thinking that women don’t 
belong in science-related careers. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
7. I have never, even for a brief moment, thought that women get promoted as 
scientists because they “know someone.” 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
8. When I notice that a woman scientist is very feminine, I might, for an instant, 
think that she should try to be more masculine. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
9. Now and then, I wonder how women scientists balance career and family. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
10. I have refused to enroll in a science course because of the professor’s gender. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
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11. I have never, even for a brief moment, thought that women scientists are 
successful because they “know someone.” 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
12. I have never, even for a split second, caught myself assuming that women 
students on campus are likely to be enrolled in arts or humanities programs. 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly 
disagree 
Somewhat 
disagree 
Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
Strongly 
agree 
 
